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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BARBARA LIMA,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
EARL CHAMBERS,
Defendant-Respondent,

Case No. 17622

vs.
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY &
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Intervenor-Appellant.
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by Plaintiff to recover for personal
injuries suffered in an automobile collision with Defendant,
an uninsured motorist, in July, 1977.

Appellant, Plaintiff's

insurance carrier, appeals from the denial of its Motion to
Intervene as a party defendant.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This action was commenced in April, 1979, in the
Second Judicial District Court of Weber County.

Thereafter,

partial summary judgment of the issue of liability was granted
against Defendant based upon his admission, in his affidavit,
that he had caused the collision.

Appellant moved to intervene
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as a party defendant, which motion was denied.
Appellant filed its Petition for Intermediate Appeal
on or about March 23, 1981, which was granted by Order of this
Court dated April 2, 1981.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks an Order of this Court
affirming the decision of the lower court denying Appellant's
attempt to intervene as a party defendant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant having accurately set forth a summary of the
facts giving rise to this matter, Plaintiff-Respondent concurs
therewith.
ARGUMENT
THE INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE PLAINTIFF
HAS NO RIGHT TO INTERVENE IN THE TORT
ACTION AGAI~ST AN UNINSURED DEFENDANT.

a.
The status of the law in Utah clearly
prohibits intervention.
The question presently before this Court has been
previously addressed and this Court has consistently reached
the same conclusion:

the insurance carrier is not a proper party

to actions in tort such as the present one.

That determination

was reached both in the case of a plaintiff attempting to include
the insurance carrier as a party, Christensen v. Peterson,
25 Utah 2d 411, 483 P.2d 447 (1971), and in the case of an
insurance company attempting to join itself in the action.

-2-
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Kesler v. Tate, 28 Utah 2d 355, 502 P.2d 565 (1972).

See also,

Wright v. Brown, 574 P.2d 1154 (Utah, 1978).
This Court set out the rationale for its determination
in Christensen, stating essentially three separate bases:

first,

that it constituted prejudicial error to inject deliberately
a disclosure of insurance coverage in a personal injury trial;
second, that it was generally improper to join an action in tort,
the primary action between Plaintiff and Defendant, with a supplemental action sounding in contract betweer. Plaintiff and the
insurance carrier; and finally, that it is intolerable to place
the parties in a position' where che insurer's interest is to
defeat the claim of its own insured, citing Holt v. Bell, 392
P.2d 361, 363 (Okl. 1964).
The law as it exists in Utah is correct, both from a
legal standpoint and an equitable one.

It should remain un-

changed, despite the challenges of Appellant, which are addressed
hereafter.
b.

Appellant will be deprived of no constitutional right by failure to allow
intervention.
It is entirely correct, as Appellant asserts, that one
whose interests may be affected by judicial proceedings is
entitled to the due process of law guaranteed by Utah Const,
Art. I, §7:

the right to be heard, with all of the procedural

safeguards and opportunities the term "due process" entails.
The fundamental misconception of Appellant in the present case

-3-
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is its assertion that it has such a protectable interest; it
does not.
The case before this Court is one sounding in tort
between the Plaintiff and the Defendant.

No allegation has been

made that Appellant has committed a wrongful act rendering it
liable to Plaintiff for damages, nor could such an allegation
be sustained.

This action seeks merely to establish that Plain-

tiff has been harmed, that the person causing that harm is the
DefEn1ant, and the extent of that harm.

None of these things

involve or implicate the Appellant for tort liability.
Appellant's relationship with the Plaintiff, on the
other hand, stems from a contract between the two whereby
Appellant, in exchange for a fee, agreed to provide Plaintiff
with insurance protection.

Appellant's interests are affected

only if and when it is called upon to perform under its contract;
i.e. when a money judgment is awarded to Plaintiff against the
Defendant who, by virtue of his uninsured status, is unable to
satisfy it.

In other words, the Appellant's obligation matures

only after the satisfaction of a condition precedent, the resolution of the tort action in favor of Plaintiff against an uninsured Defendant.
At such time as Appellant is called upon to perform
under its contract, and it questions the validity of that contract or its required performance, it may seek redress in the
courts.

Certainly due process requires no more than this.

Due process does not require that Appellant be allowed to inter-

-4-
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vene in this action, one totally distinct from an action to
interpret the contract of insurance.

The mere possibility that

Appellant, at some future date, may be required to do what it
has promised to do is insufficient to require Appellant's entry
into this suit, which is solely between Plaintiff and Defendant
herein.
Appellant's assertions that failure to allow it to
intervene herein will result in the Plaintiff and the uninsured
motorist conspiring :0 obtain a judgment and an unlimited award
of damages is without foundation.

Appellant seems to disregard

the necessity of Plaintiff meeting her burden of proof and discounts the ability of the courts to ensure legitimate proceedings.

Surely the Appellant can not have so little faith in

the judicial system.

Plaintiff will receive a judgment for

damages only if her case is proved by competent evidence, and
only to the extent warranted by that evidence.

The trial Court

is fully capable of maintaining the integrity of its proceedings
without Appellant's presence as watchdog.
This is so even if, as Appellant seems to assume, the
Defendant will not actively contest the measure of damages.
That assumption is not necessarily correct, however.

The Defen-

dant is not excused from his liability solely by virtue of his
status as an uninsured motorist.

He will be subject to any

award of damages Plaintiff receives against him, and it cannot
be assumed that the Defendant will have no interest in keeping
such an award as low as possible.

-5-
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Similarly, Appellant's assertion that it will be
denied due process because it is prohibited from asserting any
type of defense is groundless.

Appellant may, if called upon

to perform its contract, assert any and all defenses to that
contract which it has available.

No further protection is

needed by Appellant, and no more is given any person in like
circumstances.

Nor will that, as Appellant asserts, result

in a second trial of the same issues.
is contractual and,

shou~~

a dispute arise, the issues to be

determined would concern the contract.
has no

interes~

Appellant's obligation

As noted above, Appellant

in or standing to raise defenses to the tort

action, and such issues would be inappropriate in any dispute
between Plaintiff and Appellant.

The two cases being entirely

distinct, there would be no violation of the principle of
judicial economy, since the same issues would not be litigated
twice.
Appellant's interests with, and obligations to, Plaintiff being entirely separate and distinct from those involved
in this suit between Plaintiff and Defendant, and Appellant
having full recourse to the courts at some later date if need
be, there is no violation of due process in preventing Appellant's intervention herein.
c.
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, does not require that Appellant's
intervention be allowed.
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides for
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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intervention " ... (2) when the representation of the applicant's
interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the
applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the action •••• "
This rule, then, requires three elements for intervention to be
allowed, all of which must be present:

an interest in the

action; inadequate representation of that interest; and a judgment which may be binding on the applicant.

As will be seen,

none of these elements exist in the present suit with regard to
Appellant.
1.

An interest in the action -- As has been previously

noted, Appellant has no interest in the instant action, which is
in tort and exists between Plaintiff and Defendant.

Appellant's

interest lies in its contractual relationship with Plaintiff,
which is not involved in this suit.

Appellant's liability is

secondary, arising only upon the conclusion of the present
action favorably to Plaintiff and Plaintiff's invoking her contract with Appellant.
This Court recognized the distinction of interests
in Campbell v. Stagg, 596 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1979), an action for
personal injuries suffered in an automobile accident.

In that

case, the Plaintiff, believing his injuries minimal, executed
a release naming both the Defendant and his insurer, State
Farm, in exchange for payment from the insurer.

Subsequently,

the Plaintiff's condition deteriorated, he rescinded his release
and brought suit against the Defendant.

At trial, Defendant

sought to vacate the trial setting because the insurer had not

-7-
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been named as an indispensable party.

The motion was denied

and Plaintiff was awarded a judgment.

In affirming that the

insurer need not be made a party, this Court said:
State Farm has committed no act making
it liable in tort to Plaintiff, as has
defendant. State Farm did, however, contractually bind itself with defendant~e
insured, to compensate persons such as
plaintiff in the event of a collision caused
by defendant. State Farm's liability to
plaintiff arises only secondarily, through
its contractual arrangement with defendant,
and the release agreement itself cannot
alter State Farm's liability to defendant
under the terms of contract between them.
In Utah, a plaintiff must direct his
act1on against the actual tortfeasor, not
the insurer. The fact that plaintiff signed
a release agreement which named the insurer
as a releasee does not change the nature
of the rights between plaintiff and the
insurer; plaintiff has no direct cause of
action against the insurer which he could
release.
Plaintiff's only cause of action
lies against defendant, which is an action
in tort.

596 P.2d at 1039 (Emphasis in original; footnote omitted).
While in Campbell the insurer was that of defendant
where here it is that of Plaintiff, the distinction between the
insurer's interest in contract and the parties' interest in tort
is equally applicable in the case at bar.

Appellant's interest

lying in contract with Plaintiff, it has no interest in the present suit justifying intervention under Rule 24.
2.

Inadequate representation -- Appellant having no

interest in the present litigation, it can not be said that its
interests will be inadequately represented.

Nevertheless, as

stated above, it can not be assumed that Defendant will not

-8-
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attempt to minimize the damages which might be awarded against
him, since he will be liable thereon notwithstanding the existence of uninsured motorist coverage.

Further, the burden

placed upon the Plaintiff to satisfy the fact finder by competent
evidence of the extent of damages suffered will more than adequately protect Appellant from any attempt at having the amount
of such damages established, through collusion, as a higher
figure than justified.

It might be noted, perhaps unnecessarily,

that Plaintiff has no intention of

;~llowing

such a course of

action at any rate.
l.:_

Binding judgment -- Any judgment rendered in this

action will be against Defendant, not Appellant.
judgment will not bind Appellant.

As such, the

Appellant's obligation to pay

Plaintiff will arise, if at all, from its contract with Plaintiff, and that contract likewise determines the extent of
Appellant's liability.
While it is true that the award of a judgment against
Defendant may signal the time when Appellant's obligation arises,
this is so not because the judgment acts directly upon Appellant
but because the contract, as drafted by Appellant, sets forth
that occurrence as the condition upon which Appellant shall perform on its contract.

Similarly, the amount of a judgment

against Defendant may determine the extent of Appellant's liability to Plaintiff, but again not merely because it is a judgment but because Appellant's contract utilizes that amount as
the computation of Appellant's obligation to pay.

-9-
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seen from the fact that, regardless of the size of judgment
rendered against Defendant, Appellant will be obligated to pay
no more than the limit set forth in the contract between it and
Plaintiff.
Finally, Plaintiff could not execute upon the judgment
against Appellant.

Plaintiff could only, upon the award of a

judgment, seek to enforce her contract with Appellant.

Appellant

could then assert any defenses to that contract it may have and
ultimately seek the protection of the courts, if need be.

Only

upon the resolution of any litigation to interpret and enforce
the contract, should that become necessary, would there be a
judgment binding upon Appellant.

Of course, it is readily

apparent that in any such litigation Appellant would of necessity
be a party, rendering it unnecessary that Appellant become a
party herein.

None of the requirements of Rule 24 having been

met in this case, intervention is not permissible pursuant

the~~.

d.
Public policy requires that intervention
be denied.
This Court noted in Christensen v. Peterson, 25 Utah
2d 411, 483 P.2d 447, 448 (1971), citing Holt v. Bell, 392 P.2d
361, 363 (Okl. 1964), that:
[w]hen the parties are placed in a
position where the interest of an insurer
is to defeat the claim of its own insured,
the position of the parties is such that the
court cannot countenance the situation.
The placing of the parties thusly virtually
makes the ,1aintiff's insurer the liability
insurer of the defendant and interested
in defeating plaintiff's claim.
Such is the case at bar.
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1

Appellant herein drew up the contract of insurance
between it and Plaintiff, established the conditions to be met,
determined the requirements under which it would provide coverage,
set the premiums to be paid by Plaintiff and otherwise dictated
the terms of the contract.

It can be safely assumed that Plain-

tiff had no input in the drafting of the contract; she could
accept the terms or take her business elsewhere.

Plaintiff

accepted the contract and performed thereunder by paying the
specified premiums and meeting the other requirements ~hereof.
Certainly this Court cannot now tolerate Appellant's attempt,
after reaping the benefit of Plaintiff's full performance under
the contract, to take a position antagonistic to Plaintiff's
interests and essentially defeat the contract it itself had
fashioned.

To do so would be unjust and unfair.
Appellant could have included in its contract the right

to enter into litigation such as this with a position hostile
to its insured; it failed to do so.

The legislature, in pro-

viding for uninsured motorist coverage (Utah Code Ann.
§41-12-21.l (1967)), could easily have foreseen the very situation present before this Court and explicitly provided for the
insurer's right to intervene; it did not.

Plaintiff, by sug-

gesting these alternatives, intimates no opinion on their enforceability, but merely asserts that if such an anamolous
result as Appellant proposes is to be accepted, it be explicitly
and clearly provided for before the contract is entered into.
CONCLUSION
The denial of Appellant's attempt to intervene in this
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action contrary to Plaintiff's interests contravenes neither
the right of due process nor the provisions of Rule 24.

Appel-

lant has no interest requiring its intervention in this proceeding, and may avail itself fully of any defenses it may have
to its contract at such time as it is called upon to perform.
To allow Appellant to enter and attempt to defeat Plaintiff's
interests under the contract between Plaintiff and Appellant
would be manifestly unfair.
The

~~wer

Court's order denying intervention is correct

and should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~day of October, 1981.
HAVAS AND HAVAS
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EDWARD B. HAVAS
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